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ChAPTeR  TWeNTY-TWO
 
Society, PoliticS, 
and the Search for  
community in ruSSia
Samuel A. Greene
The degree to which contemporary discussions of Russia avoid dealing 
with Russian society is striking.1 This was not always (and is still not en-
tirely) the case. Cultural historians in particular have long studied the 
evolution, revolutionary dismantling, and partial persistence of the in-
stitutions underpinning social relations, and the end of the Soviet Union 
brought a revival of interest in the long story of Russian society. The dif-
ficulties of Russia’s post-Soviet transition, however, and its “failure” to 
democratize, have led many to take society out of the picture: Because the 
social factors that may have led to Russia’s retrenched authoritarianism 
seemed so deterministic and path-dependent, social scientists have often 
preferred to ignore them, looking instead either to agency or to the impact 
of formal political institutions, present and past. Even the long-running ar-
gument about Russians’ supposedly weak social capital and overall lack of 
trust is generally explained as a result not of societal factors but of political 
choices made by elites, mostly over the course of the twentieth century.
I will not deal here with the question of whether those disciplinary 
and methodological preferences were as intellectually robust as they were 
politically correct; much of the social science done in and on Russia in 
recent years has been excellent and enlightening. Nor would I suggest that 
no (or even not enough) attention is being paid to Russian society; indeed, 
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fascinating work continues to be produced by sociologists and anthropolo-
gists of various ilk. But the vogue for politics and political economy has 
meant that this social research, when put in the broader context of Rus-
sian area studies, is almost inevitably reduced to a dependent variable. 
Certainly, politics and the political economy do produce social results. My 
task here, however, is to demonstrate that social factors may also produce 
political results. 
On the surface, this seems obvious enough. The transformation of 
economic grievance into political mobilization in Pikalevo, Zabaikalsk, 
and other so-called monogoroda—towns heavily dependent on a single 
industry for employment and revenue—and also in larger cities, includ-
ing Vladivostok and Kaliningrad, forced the Russian government to react, 
through a combination of co-optation and repression, where it would prob-
ably have preferred to remain aloof. The regional elections in the fall of 
2009 provided a second illustration of the hypothesis that complete politi-
cal complacency cannot be expected of the population if the government 
does not hold up its economic side of the bargain. Perhaps more important-
ly, however, the elections may have demonstrated the remarkable degree to 
which a large section of the population, if not the majority, is willing to buy 
into the system even when it falters. And finally, the reemergence of the 
motorists’ movement—with new tactics and new leadership but the same 
demands—reflects the ability of Russian society to generate and sustain 
grassroots engagement and, indeed, to set at least a portion of the political 
agenda in a sustained manner, despite what we think we know about social 
capital and trust.
But these examples are almost too obvious. The question I want to ad-
dress here is as follows: Are there fundamental social processes under way 
that have the potential to drive the evolution of the Russian state and, if so, 
how might that occur during the next ten years? In this chapter, I outline 
what I believe to be “four and a half” key phenomena and then lay out two 
basic scenarios for how they might evolve—one that is inertial (but not 
static), in which current trends continue; and another in which certain key 
changes occur that allow society and state–society relations in Russia to 
develop along a normatively more “optimistic” pathway to 2020.
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Four and a Half Key Social Phenomena
Before I launch into a discussion of the “four and a half” key social phe-
nomena that I argue will shape Russia’s future, I should explain two basic 
assumptions that underpin my understanding of Russian society. The first 
has to do with deinstitutionalization: Russia is not entirely devoid of social 
institutions, but it is close. In treating institutions here, I take the socio-
logical definition of an institution as a set of ingrained rules and norms 
governing behavior for individuals or groups of individuals that allows one 
to predict with reasonable accuracy what the reaction will be to any given 
action. Thus, in saying that Russia is almost devoid of institutions, I do not 
refer to the myriad establishments laid out on paper, enshrined in bricks 
and mortar, and endowed with budgets of varying generosity; rather, I refer 
to the fact that none of these “paper” institutions—whether the law in gen-
eral, the apparatus of the state, or higher education or the Russian Ortho-
dox Church—allows Russian citizens to predict with reasonable accuracy 
how any given social or state–societal interaction will proceed. Moreover, 
with the partial exception of the Caucasus and other long-standing ethnic 
communities in the Urals, Siberia, and the far north, the Soviet Union and 
the turmoil of transition together succeeded in eviscerating whatever hori-
zontal social institutions may have existed in the past, whether religious, 
ethnic, tribal, land-based, familial, or other.
The second assumption flows from the first: In a deinstitutionalized 
environment, certainty is at a premium, and the balance between certainty 
and uncertainty is the key commodity in any social interaction. This in-
creases the relative trust placed in people who may be termed nashi—
ours—and reduces trust in people who may be considered chuzhie—other 
(although it may have no discernible impact on the overall stock of trust). 
This endows those able through their status or station to manufacture and 
manipulate uncertainty with a tremendous degree of power. And this cata-
strophically lowers the appetite for risk.
That last point about risk leads directly to the first of the four and a half 
key phenomena. There is a common myth in the discussion of Russian 
politics—and particularly Russian civil society and civic engagement—
that Russians are passive. This is not true: Russians are aggressively im-
mobile. The difference is more than semantic. Passive people may not be 
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easily led, but they are relatively easily pushed. Aggressively immobile 
people are difficult to move in any circumstances, precisely because their 
immobility is strategic and rational. An environment bereft of social insti-
tutions is one in which there are few if any shared and replicable pathways 
to success. As a result, the relative comfort and prosperity that any Russian 
citizen may enjoy is the result of a singular, unique set of circumstances, 
owing exclusively to that citizen’s ability to cope with her or his uncertain 
environment (the order of the pronouns here is not arbitrary; women are 
generally significantly better at coping in Russia than men). Change, then, 
threatens to undermine these achievements, potentially forcing the citizen 
to start again in the face of uncertainty—a wholly unattractive prospect. 
This is true on both the micro and macro levels. Russians living in failing 
cities such as Pikalevo are thus unwilling to leave not because they feel 
good about their prospects at home but because they have no certainty that 
they will be able to navigate a new set of bureaucratic and other formal 
and informal relationships in a new setting. Similarly, Russians oppose 
liberalizing and democratizing reforms not because they are happy with 
the status quo of political and economic monopolization but because any 
large-scale change risks sweeping away achievements built on extremely 
shallow foundations.
The second phenomenon is the particular way in which the so-called 
resource curse has manifested itself in Russia: Rather than fuel outright 
repression (à la Myanmar) or heavy-handed populism (à la Venezuela), the 
abundance of natural resources and the associated rent flows have cush-
ioned a mutually agreeable divorce between the government and its peo-
ple, following seven decades of overly intimate relations. It is often said 
that the implicit Putin-era social contract in Russia has been one in which 
the population agree to ignore politics in return for economic growth. I 
would modify that somewhat: The implicit social contract, if there is one, 
affords maximum autonomy to both sides of the bargain, provided neither 
significantly impinges on the interests and comfort of the other. It is an 
inherently fraught arrangement, however, similar to Soviet-era divorces in 
which irreconcilable spouses were forced to continue living in the same 
apartment; there is bound to be some friction. Oil, gas, and the economic 
growth they generate provide some lubrication, but there remain limits to 
the degree of alienation that is possible. The fact of shared space becomes 
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most evident on Russia’s roads, where the elite and ordinary citizens live 
on two sides of an almost institutionalized lawlessness, in which the elite 
are forbidden nothing and the non-elite have no recourse. 
The third phenomenon is thus increasing friction. The more the elite 
and the non-elite crystallize and defend their own individual achieve-
ments—whether in the form of armored motorcades or high fences around 
even modest private landholdings—the more conflict becomes inevitable. 
The debasing of the public space in order to maintain the private—what 
Michael Burawoy referred to as “involution”—helped people cope with 
the tumult of transition, but as Russia’s “new normal” has been estab-
lished and appetites begin to grow again, there is a creeping privatization 
of the commons.2 It is not only the roads that have seemingly become the 
private domain of the elite, together with the lives of those who happen 
to be on them. Moscow’s sidewalks and courtyards are continually and 
repeatedly privatized by anyone who wants to park a car. Public nature 
reserves become the private hunting grounds of anyone with sufficient ac-
cess to a helicopter, and the country’s forests are littered with the remains 
of countless picnics, as though the forest itself were disposable. This re-
lentless extension of the rules of elite and mass private behavior into Rus-
sia’s shared social spaces is an irritant for all involved, as each individual 
encounters behavior consonant with his or her own behavior but dissonant 
with his or her personal interests. The natural reaction is an attempt to ex-
tend, provided the means are available, the power of one’s professed (but 
not performed) social norms onto others—an attempt that, given Russia’s 
lack of functioning social and sociopolitical institutions, is doomed to fail 
and produce only more irritation.
The fourth phenomenon is a relatively new means of coping with the 
second and third phenomena, what I will call “individual moderniza-
tion.” The advent of globalization—by which I mean not so much trade 
and economic interdependence as global communication and global cul-
ture—opens up avenues that were not available to Soviet-era dissidents. 
Certainly, gaining access through illicit radio reception or samizdat to 
the world beyond the USSR was an important part of both challenging 
the Soviet regime and building an autonomous moral space outside its 
ideological boundaries but inside its geographical borders. But the end 
of censorship, the opening of borders, and the growing availability of the 
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Internet and other communication technologies has fed an explosion of in-
dividual strategies of identity formation within modern Russia. Especially 
in Moscow, but not only there, adherents can be found for all the fashion 
trends, schools of thought, political and social undercurrents, and eco-
nomic projects present in the world at large. Young, educated, dynamic, 
and mobile Russians—as well as a good many of their older compatri-
ots—are seemingly as likely to identify themselves with a global meaning 
as with a local one. This is true in much of the world, but in the Russian 
context of deinstitutionalization, state/society alienation, and the constant 
friction of the public space, it takes on particular importance: While re-
maining physically present in Russia (or at least resident), Russians may 
take themselves socially, politically, and intellectually out of the Russian 
space. The consequences of this are contradictory. On the one hand, this 
is potentially tremendously liberating for a large number of the country’s 
best and brightest. On the other hand, however, it greatly lowers the de-
gree to which those same best and brightest may be willing to invest in the 
modernization of Russia’s own social space.
The “half” phenomenon, finally, lies somewhere between the third 
and the fourth phenomena just described and is this: Despite its faults, 
Russia’s current system of social and political relations has its adherents. 
These are not just those in the elite and below it who are consistently able 
to maximize their benefit from the manufacture and manipulation of un-
certainty. Even those who are not on the winning end of that bargain invest 
in the system’s survival. Witness, for example, an appeal made in June 
2010 by a group of schoolteachers in the town of Voskresensk, not far from 
Moscow, to President Dmitri Medvedev. The teachers, who were drafted 
into serving on the local board of elections during the municipal elections 
in October 2009, now find themselves at the center of an investigation 
into electoral fraud in which they themselves admit they were complicit. 
What they want from Medvedev, though, is not to right the wrong but an 
intercession simply to prevent them from being prosecuted. Referring to 
the hundreds of thousands of ordinary Russians who, like the Voskresensk 
teachers, helped falsify elections in 2009, human rights activist Sergei 
Kovalev told Ekho Moskvy radio that “lying has ceased to be a means of 
hiding the truth and has become instead a ritual of loyalty and patriotism.” 
That may be overstating the case; the Voskresensk teachers are unlikely 
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to have acted out of any great patriotism, and they were probably threat-
ened with dismissal or at least docked pay if they did not cooperate. But 
the reality is, when faced with a situation in which they could protect 
their positions by cooperating with the investigation in service of the truth, 
they chose instead to seek shelter in the lie. This is a deeper degree of 
co-optation than we see among the young men and women who join Nashi 
and other government-run youth groups in exchange for a trip to a lake and 
money on a cellphone account; the latter is simply opportunistic, while the 
former is calculated. 
Understanding the Politics of Society
Much of the discussion of states and societies—and thus of politics—is 
guided by the standard Weberian definition of a state, with its emphasis on 
the effective monopolization of legitimate violence. In this conceptualiza-
tion, the state is almost always seen as the active party, seeking to generate 
and maximize its power, whereas society is at best confined to the role of 
resistance to or acceptance of that power and, thus, the legitimization of the 
state’s monopoly on forceful coercion. The “systems” approach launched 
by Talcott Parsons went some distance toward elucidating the complex in-
terrelations between political and societal actors and institutions that un-
derpin this arrangement, but it has been roundly criticized for a teleological 
assumption that some systems are developed and others are developing, 
with all trajectories leading to a similar (read Western) endpoint.
This chapter is guided by a somewhat different conception, proposed 
by Joel Migdal under the headline “State in Society”—in other words, 
the conceit that states, broadly speaking, are rooted in and derivative of 
the societies they purport to govern. Migdal places the emphasis on “pro-
cess—on the ongoing struggles among shifting coalitions over the rules for 
daily behavior”:
These processes determine how societies and states create and 
maintain distinct ways of structuring day-to-day life—the nature 
of the rules that govern people’s behavior, whom they benefit and 
whom they disadvantage, which sorts of elements unite people 
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and which divide them, what shared meaning people hold about 
their relations with others and about their place in the world. And 
these processes also ordain the ways that rules and patterns of 
domination and subordination are challenged and change.3
Migdal, in turn, draws importantly on Edward Shils’s use of the concept 
of community. Thus, Shils writes that
. . . a community is not just a group of concrete and particular 
persons; it is, more fundamentally, a group of persons acquiring 
their significance by their embodiment of values which transcend 
them and by their conformity with standards and rules from which 
they derive their dignity.4
To Migdal, it is this process of creation of community that ultimately 
guides the formation of states. The crucial aspects of this relationship are 
brought into particularly sharp focus in social, political, and economic 
environments undergoing rapid change, such as Russia. In these sorts of 
settings, it is perhaps to be expected that citizens—individually and col-
lectively—have a difficult time arriving at the shared rules of behavior, 
and thus shared values, that lead to community. Migdal writes:
In such bewildering and fragmented settings, individuals must 
respond not only to the constraints and opportunities posed by 
one organization but by many. Some of these organizations exist 
side by side peacefully, but others are struggling actively with 
one another over what the rules of the game should be. Individu-
als thus confront a fundamental lack of coherence in their social 
worlds, with various organizations proposing contradictory values 
and modes of behavior. Models that assume a fundamental unity 
underlying one’s actions, feelings, and thoughts are inadequate 
for explaining the diverse strategies people use in acting within 
these heterogeneous organizational settings.5
The “four and a half” social phenomena outlined above illustrate how 
this dilemma plays out in Russia. With the fracturing of the public space, 
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the flattening of the hierarchies that governed Soviet interactions, and the 
dismantling of the institutions of certainty in social life, citizens in all 
social strata retreated from the public space, fortified their private spaces, 
and then engaged in a privatization of the commons. This spectacular de-
valuation of community is self-reinforcing, proving to all participants that 
their strategies are justified and correct, precisely because everyone else’s 
strategies are simultaneously identical (in their individualism) and threat-
ening (in their rejection of the communal). 
But this is not to say that Russians are valueless. With the evaporation 
of broad social institutions, citizens and elites alike have fallen back on 
residual institutions. Thus, the particularistic networks and arrangements 
of family, friendship, clan, ethnicity, and chin hold more value than oth-
er arrangements—such as law-bound institutions—that might inculcate 
more universalistic values. An excellent illustration of how this works is 
provided by an anthropological study of a remote community in Siberia, 
where David Anderson found “numerous examples of institutions which 
truly mediate civil, political and economic interests,” in large part be-
cause he did not look for them in the formalistic, “differentiated” cat-
egories proposed by the mainstream civil society literature, but rather 
by observing everyday life in the town.6 These institutions, however, are 
highly particular, pertaining either to ethnic or uniquely local economic 
and social circumstances. The challenge for Russia is thus to aggregate 
the trust generated in such institutions into forms that can be linked and 
propagated at a national level.
It could (and, indeed, has been) argued that the fault in this failure 
to aggregate trust lies in a problem of values—or, more precisely, of cul-
ture—that has roots considerably deeper than those of the present politi-
cal arrangement. Because the object of this chapter is to look, however 
tentatively, into the future, I must deal with the suggestion that it is de-
termined by the past. The most systematic argument for path-dependency 
in Russia has been put forward by Oleg Kharkhordin, Mikhail Afanasev, 
and Richard Pipes, who write (separately) that Orthodox, absolutist, and 
patrimonial models of social interaction are, to quote Pipes, “rooted in the 
failure of Russian statehood to evolve from a private into a public institu-
tion” and thus encourage not the consolidation of community but, in the 
words of Kharkhordin, the “diffusion of civic life.”7 
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There is some debate as to the source of such “archaic” tendencies, 
with Kharkhordin and others suggesting that the dominance of the old is a 
result of the failure of the new, whereas Afanasev argues that the new fails 
precisely because of the dominance of the old. And it is exactly because of 
this fundamental and irreconcilable disagreement that the historicist argu-
ment holds little or no explanatory value for contemporary phenomena in 
Russia. When Russians today face challenges in social interactions, they 
are confronted simultaneously and inseparably with the dominance of the 
old and the failure of the new. Thus, in guiding decisions regarding social 
interactions, neither of these phenomena is causally prior to the other. In 
other words, Russian citizens inevitably make decisions based on factors 
that are present now, and it is this immediacy that both gives meaning to 
the past and creates the future. 
Immediacy, of course, is the fundamental concept of game theory, an 
approach that models human behavior in social settings based on the rapid 
resolution of present dilemmas based on the unambiguous evaluation of 
past experiences and future consequences. The political game theorist 
Margaret Levi uses game-theoretical approaches to argue that citizens ex-
ercise “contingent consent” vis-à-vis the demands of their states—which, 
in our conceptualization, are the reflections of the rules set or accepted by 
communities—and that the propensity to consent increases in proportion 
to the degree to which “citizens perceive the government to be trustwor-
thy,” “the proportion of other citizens complying,” and the ability of “citi-
zens [to] receive information confirming” the prior two indicators.8
Following Levi, Charles Tilly asks the question “How have members 
of trust networks defended themselves and their resources against pre-
dation?”—which is particularly relevant to Russia, where predation has 
become the dominant strategy of certain groups of elites. The answer, Tilly 
finds through a broad comparative study, is a combination of three strate-
gies: “The concealment strategy . . . fortifies the boundary between insid-
ers and outsiders by means of secrecy and dissimulation. The clientage 
strategy . . . depends on some power holder’s patronage, usually at a hand-
some price, for defense against other potential predators. Dissimulation 
. . . involves conceding just enough compliance with rulers’ demands and 
regulations to hold off close surveillance and expropriation.”9
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In essence, all these strategies are an escape from politics, because in 
the system to which they pertain, politics is a game of predation. In other 
words, what one observes in Russia can be explained as a natural reaction 
both to the anticommunal rules of behavior that encourage authoritarian-
ism and the ways in which that authoritarian rule is exercised. Democrati-
zation, then, is a story of the reintegration of citizens into politics through 
the regeneration of a meaningful political community:
To the extent that people integrate their trust networks into public 
politics, they come to rely on governmental performance for main-
tenance of those networks. They also gain power, individual and 
collective, through the connections to government those networks 
mediate. They acquire an unbreakable interest in governmental 
performance. The political stakes matter. Paying taxes, buying 
governmental securities, yielding private information to officials, 
depending on government for benefits, and releasing network 
members for military service cement that interest and promote 
active bargaining over the terms of its fulfillment.10
It is thus a mistake to assume, as many normative and historicist theo-
rists do, that rules derive from values. Indeed, it is the other way around: 
Rules are written to make human interactions more effective and predict-
able (at least for those writing the rules), and when they prove themselves 
to be sufficiently beneficial to a sufficiently large (or powerful) group of 
people in a community, over time they evolve into values. The question 
for the remainder of this chapter is “What are the factors that could drive 
a shift in Russia from the dominance of the individual to the value of the 
communal?” 
Russia 2020: Scenarios for the Future
From where we stand today, there appear to be two potential scenarios 
for the future: one inertial, in which existing trends continue until they 
descend into outright crisis; and a second, in which a few key factors 
shift and a more “optimistic” storyline emerges. I start with the first, as 
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a baseline. To call this scenario inertial, however, is not to say that it is 
static; social processes cannot simply stand still, and it is unfathomable 
that nothing at all—or even nothing significant—would change over the 
next ten years.
In the inertial scenario, all the phenomena described above remain 
in place: aggressive immobility, state/society alienation, increasing social 
friction, blossoming individual modernization, and an active conservative 
constituency. Over time, as the state’s retrograde apparatus becomes in-
creasingly ineffective and continuing political and economic monopolies 
reduce marginal economic growth to nearly zero, social friction increases 
and comfortable alienation becomes harder and harder to maintain. 
To an extent, we can already see this scenario unfolding. The national-
ist riots that gripped Moscow in December 2010 bear witness to virtually 
all the phenomena described above. Rioters in the hundreds and thou-
sands, many of whom perceive themselves to be victims of marginalization 
and relative deprivation, and who are unable to partake of the economic 
glamour that has become so conspicuous in the capital, moved concertedly 
and violently into the public space, claiming the commons for their own. 
The authorities did their best to ignore them; President Dmitri Medvedev 
“tweeted” first about an Elton John concert, and only then about the riots, 
promising blandly that those guilty would be punished; Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin remained all but silent on the issue for several days. In 
the end, however, this separation could not be maintained: Riot police 
engaged, political interventions were held, pressure was applied.
The broader lesson that was learned, however, was that the commons, 
like nature, abhor a vacuum. Individuals, whether ordinary citizens or the 
elite, may temporarily enjoy the delusion that the space between their 
private refuges—the streets on which they drive, the metro in which they 
commute, the squares on which they walk—are empty, airless, and sound-
less; but they are not. The fact of rioters in the streets and in the metro, 
the omnipresent but largely invisible threat of violence and personal harm, 
compounded by the absence of trusted sources of information, for a time 
turned the commons into the jungle, a state of nature in which life could 
indeed be “nasty, brutish, and short.” And until the rioters themselves 
went home, nobody—not the public, not the state—had the power to re-
store order. 
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Returning to the scenario, this increasing friction eventually pushes 
the state into a more forward relationship with society, first to set rules in 
defense of elite privilege, and then to regulate social relations themselves 
to maintain stability. But because nothing changes within the state itself—
the active conservative constituency is sufficient to overcome any pressure 
from the creative and entrepreneurial classes, whose political ties with 
Russia are increasingly weak—this amounts to a reprivatization of the 
commons, rather than a deprivatization. Thus, non-elite individuals are 
pushed out of the common space, in the name of harmony and stability, but 
are then increasingly deprived of access to it altogether, as the captured 
state redistributes the benefits of the public space to the elite. 
Is it not possible that Russian citizens, seeing the commons increas-
ingly occupied by the elite, would react and demand change, much as did 
Egyptians and Tunisians in January and February 2011? In theory, yes. 
Often, the failure of Russians—and, indeed, of people in underdeveloped 
countries around the world—to place “sufficient” value on the commons 
is explained with reference to poverty, which theoretically prejudices par-
ticular and material interests over those that are universal and ephemeral. 
Unfortunately, there is insufficient rigorous research on poverty, or depri-
vation more broadly, in Russia and its impact on political engagement that 
would allow us to draw robust conclusions. However, research in India 
shows that poverty is correlated neither with a lack of support for democ-
racy nor with levels of “political efficacy and . . . participation”; however, 
significantly correlated are levels of education, information, social capital, 
and access. Similar results have been reported in Africa and other parts 
of South Asia.11 And developments in North Africa have underscored the 
validity of these findings.
It is not, however, that simple. An uprising from below will trigger a 
response from above. Indeed, Adam Przeworski argues that the problem of 
poverty and democracy resides not with the poor but with the rich:
Increased participation of the poor is a threat to democracy only in 
situations where elites, fearing drastic redistribution, are prone to 
overthrow democracy. For the poor themselves, democracy might 
be the only viable means to get what they want. Yet, if they act 
precipitously, they may lose even that chance.12
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The situation Przeworski describes fits Russia almost perfectly. A slow 
crisis may be expected to encourage splits within the elite, with those less 
certain of their future either exiting the system or lobbying for gradual 
change, much as the so-called 1960s generation did in the USSR, embold-
ened by the Khrushchevian “thaw” and frustrated by Brezhnevite stagna-
tion. But such politically lethargic change will look to the masses like 
inertia (which, in effect, it is), and any uprising in response will make no 
distinction between the relatively more and less conservative members of 
the old guard. (Russian society tried to make that distinction once and is 
quite convinced that it did so in vain.) The result will be a reconsolidation 
of the elite (minus, perhaps, whatever marginal portion jumps ship) in de-
fense of its status and privilege and a standoff with the mobilized sections 
of the public, the outcome of which is deeply uncertain.
This, then, is a scenario of alienation pushed to its limits, generating 
conflict and dragging the state into a futile and counterproductive authori-
tarian engagement with society. The result by 2020 will be a Russia with a 
severely fractured political and social space, a stagnant economy, and ex-
tremely low levels of political identification between citizens and the state 
to which they nominally belong. But because of the aggressive immobility 
of both the masses and the elite, the only way out of this situation will be 
through a profound and protracted crisis, sufficiently decimating individu-
als’ prosperity and comfort that change will begin to look relatively more 
attractive. Given, however, that change will come in a climate of political 
alienation, the absence of a true public sphere, and the lack of legitimate, 
ingrained horizontal social institutions, it is highly unlikely that change 
will be democratic.
The second, more “optimistic” scenario likewise assumes that all four 
and a half key social phenomena remain in place but supposes one crucial 
difference. At some point early in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century, say in 2011 or 2012, the Russian government, faced with increas-
ing social (and, indeed, intra-elite) tensions and a continually faltering 
economy, pushes toward maximum economic integration with the West, 
particularly with the European Union, and the latter reciprocates. Thus, 
Russia would join the World Trade Organization, conclude a free invest-
ment and trade deal with the European Union, drop visa requirements for 
EU citizens, and obtain visa-free travel for its own citizens to Europe. Over 
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time, a growing number of Russian citizens would begin to form institu-
tional relationships and strategies based on their newfound unfettered ac-
cess to the European space, for education, entrepreneurship, investment, 
and other purposes, compensating for the lack of institutions at home. 
Russian entrepreneurs in various spheres—whether in business, edu-
cation, research, or even government—do not suffer from a lack of good 
ideas. What they do lack, however, is an institutional environment that 
makes it attractive to invest in those ideas while not leaving Russia. In this 
regard, supporting Skolkovo and other official “modernization” projects is 
not enough. There is no reason to believe that the new institutions created 
in Russia under the banner of modernization will differ in their essence 
from those institutions that already exist, distorting and manipulating the 
law to empower officials and disenfranchise citizens. 
The approach to “democratizing” Russia to date has focused on iden-
tifying the potential stakeholders in new institutions and attempting to 
mobilize them to reform existing ones. The problem with this approach is 
that it ignores the fact that existing institutions have their own stakehold-
ers and that they, unlike the potential stakeholders of as-yet-nonexistent 
institutions, are already empowered. But a lowering of the barriers to the 
individual-level integration of Russians living in Russia into the Euro-
pean institutional space would have the consequence of allowing Russians 
to become stakeholders in European institutions. Already, certain Rus-
sians settle their commercial disputes in London and their human rights 
cases in Strasbourg. Russian business makes ample use of the European 
financial system. And elites and well-off members of the masses also avail 
themselves of European education, health care, and recreation. 
How this would look would depend to a great degree on the creativity of 
policymakers in Europe. But allowing more and more Russians—and par-
ticularly those in business and academia who have the potential to drive 
change at home—to rely on the stability and usability of European legal 
and institutional frameworks to support investment in their own ideas and 
strategies will have two important implications domestically. First, it will 
enrich and empower the internationally integrated members of Russia’s 
middle class (the internationally integrated members of Russia’s elite be-
ing already rich and powerful) relative to the broader conservative constit-
uency, dislodging them from the aggressive immobility described above. 
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Of particular importance, integrated citizens will gain an institutional 
foundation for their prosperity and comfort that nonintegrated citizens do 
not enjoy, increasing the attractiveness of integration for others and dem-
onstrating a realistic, obtainable, and, crucially, institutionalized pathway 
for achieving success. 
Second, it will draw into sharper focus the losses in opportunity cost 
that these same internationally integrated citizens will suffer as a result 
of Russia’s own deinstitutionalization. Even with lowered barriers to 
integration with Europe, the transaction costs of relying on European in-
stitutions would still be higher than they would be if similar institutions 
functioned in Russia. The resulting pressure for institutional reform and 
harmonization may not be overtly political, but it would have the potential 
to revitalize public interest in the commons, and thus in community, by 
demonstrating a shared interest in a public good. 
Taken together, this is sufficient to produce a consolidated domestic 
constituency for change, which will gradually drag a retrograde and reluc-
tant (but not belligerent) state into modernity. It will be a difficult road, 
and it will not be completed by 2020. But if Russia and its partners are 
open to integration—and if we reverse the standard logic that demands 
democracy as a prerequisite for integration—there may yet be a way out 
of inertia.
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